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One of the traditional functions of party members is to campaign on behalf of their party at general
elections. However, they are not the only people who volunteer for the job. In the context of the growing
literature on ‘multi-speed membership’ parties, it is important to ask what non-members do for parties
they support. This paper examines how different actors contributed to the electoral campaigns of six
parties at the 2015 UK General Election, using survey data covering not only members of the Labour,
Conservative, Liberal Democrat, United Kingdom Independence, Scottish Nationalist, and Green parties,
but also voters who identiﬁed themselves as being close to one of those parties but did not formally
belong to them. As well as exploring howmuch work they do during campaigns, we ask whether the two
groups choose different activities and are differently motivated. We ﬁnd that, at the individual level,
party members do more than non-member supporters, and that this is especially true of more intensive
forms of activity. We also ﬁnd that constituency context and political attitudes inﬂuence levels of activity
in similar ways for members and supporters. However, we ﬁnd no consistent impact from demographic
factors or ideological incongruence. At the aggregate level, we estimate that the campaign work done by
supporters may match or even exceed that done by party members.
© 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
At elections, a good ground game may not be everything but it
still means something. In a tight race, it may even mean the dif-
ference between a party winning and losing, especially in the UK, a
country carved up into single-member constituencies operating
under the plurality rule (Johnston and Pattie, 2003; Karp et al.,
2008; Fisher and Denver, 2009; Johnston et al., 2016). But if
‘boots on the ground’ are at least potentially important, who is it
who wears them and why? And what exactly do they do once
they've donned them?
The answer to the ﬁrst question has traditionally been obvious:
grassroots members of political parties. The answer to the second no
less so: delivering leaﬂets, putting up posters, holding meetings and
canvassing voters, and then getting them to the polling stations. But
what if all this no longer holds? Given (a) the almost ubiquitousr Ltd. This is an open access articledecline in the number of people joining political parties in Western
European countries (van Biezen et al., 2012), and (b) the simulta-
neous rise of new communication technologies, there is good reason
to suppose things might have changed. Developments in both the
demand- and supply-side of party politics have arguably led to the
emergence of ‘multi-speed membership parties’ (Scarrow, 2015) in
which different types of party adherents and followers play roles of
varying natures and intensities. As a consequence, traditional party
members are no longer the only signiﬁcant contributors to parties
and, by extension, to election campaign efforts.
The notion of political parties comprising not only members but
also different types of afﬁliates is not new. Already in the mid-
1960s, for instance, Duverger (1964) was distinguishing between
electors, supporters, members andmilitants. A looser conception of
afﬁliation in the American context, closer to identiﬁcation than
membership, was also inherent in Key's (1958) tripartite model of
the party in the electorate, the party organisation and the party in
ofﬁce. More recently, however, growing attention has been devoted
to the role played by party supporters and afﬁliates in political
parties in general and in election campaigns in particular (Gauja,under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
1 This research was made possible by the support of the Economic and Social
Research Council's grant ES/M007537/1. We gratefully acknowledge this support.
2https://yougov.co.uk/news/2016/09/24/labour-members-exit-poll-corbyn-wins-
all-except-yo/..
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drawing on specially commissioned survey data, our aim in this
paper is, ﬁrstly, to investigate the differences and similarities in
campaign activity in the UK General Election of 2015 of party
members and supporters - by which we mean those who strongly
identify with a party but decide not to formally join it. Speciﬁcally,
deriving our expectations from existing literature, we compare the
scope, frequency and intensity of the campaigning activities of
these two groups. We then examine whether their socio-
demographic proﬁle, political attitudes and constituency contexts
affect the intensity of their campaign activities in similar or
different ways. In broad terms, we ﬁnd that at the individual level
party members are much more likely to campaign for their
preferred parties than non-member supporters, and that this is
especially true of the more intensive forms of activity. We also ﬁnd
that constituency context (i.e. the marginality of a seat being con-
tested at the election) and the political attitudes of respondents
(especially social liberalism, postmaterialism and strong feelings
about the EU) inﬂuence levels of activity of both groups in similar
ways. Demographic factors and subjective ideological distance from
their party (ie, ‘ideological incongruence’), however, seem to have
no consistent impact on either group. For all this, however, the fact
that there are so many more supporters than members in the
country as a whole means that the sum of campaign activity un-
dertaken by supporters may match or even outweigh that of party
members at the aggregate level.
2. Multispeed membership parties and electoral activity:
what we know
In a seminal contribution to the literature on political parties,
Susan Scarrow (2015) has argued that parties in parliamentary
democracies have often adapted to the widely recognised reality of
membership decline by seeking to engage citizens beyond their
members with a range of alternative afﬁliation options. This has
resulted in the emergence of ‘multi-speed membership parties’ in
which these new options are typically centralised (because such
supporters afﬁliate directly to the central rather than their local
party), digital (in that they are facilitated by electronic communi-
cations technology), and accessible (since they are easy to exercise
at low cost). By offering such options, parties are in effect seeking to
reduce the ﬁnancial, procedural and/or reputational costs of
membership for citizens who might be sympathetic towards them.
Scarrow describes six different classes of party adherent, any
combination of which might be found empirically in a multi-speed
party: full members, 'light' members, 'cyber' members, 'ﬁnancial
sustainers', 'followers and friends' and 'party sympathisers'.
One implication of the multi-speed model for active political
engagement by citizens is that it may facilitate the development of
party links with single-issue campaigns and/or local forms of civic
action. Cross and Gauja (2014) point, for instance, to issue-speciﬁc
groups afﬁliated to parties in Australia (Rainbow Labor and Labor
for Refugees), and to community organising within the Australian
Labor Party. Under Ed Miliband's leadership, the British Labour
Party also brieﬂy experimented with community organising,
although the initiative was quietly dropped prior to the 2015
election (Bale, 2015: 140, 199, 249, 263). This mobilization strategy
seeks to emulate the American practice of recruiting supporters
directly to become active in various types of neighbourhood
volunteer work (not necessarily of an overtly political nature)
without signing up as party members. However, a key aim is to
generate support for the party, which might eventually translate
into electoral or political activity.
An obvious source of these new types of afﬁliates are individuals
who are not already members but who strongly identify with theparty. Some of these party supporters may already engage with the
party beyond the act of voting in various ways and have been
shown to undertake campaign activities traditionally associated
with party members. A recent British study by Fisher et al. (2014),
using data collected in 2010 from parties' election agents, found, for
instance, that ‘although members clearly still matter, they are not
the only source of voluntary activity, especially in election cam-
paigns’ e so much so that ‘[o]ver three quarters of constituency
(district level) campaigns in Britain recruited supporters in 2010
and on average, supporters engaged in around two thirds of the
activities of members’ e a level of input that was judged to be ‘non-
trivial’ (Fisher et al., 2014: 91e2; see also Scarrow, 2015: 103e109
and, on Australia, Gauja and Jackson, 2016: 9e12).3. Data and hypotheses: comparing the election campaign
activity of members and supporters
The comparison between party supporters and party members
in terms of their involvement in traditional forms of election
campaign activity in the UK is also the particular focus of this paper.
Using data gathered at the individual level, we explore the
campaign activities of the party members and party supporters at
the 2015 election. Immediately after the general election of May
2015, we surveyed the members of six British political partiese the
ﬁrst time they have ever been surveyed simultaneously and so soon
after an election.1 One of the reasons for conducting the survey
whenwe did was to ﬁnd out in detail (and hopefully with a greater
degree of accuracy than would have been the case had we asked
them long after the event) what they did for their parties during the
campaign. At the same time as conducting those surveys, we also
surveyed these parties' strongest non-member supporterse that is,
people who felt a strong sense of partisan identiﬁcation but who
were not themselves members. Again, the simultaneous imple-
mentation of parallel surveys of members and supporters is a ﬁrst
for Britain, and gives us a unique dataset with which to work.
Themembers survey was conducted inMay 2015 (Conservative:
n ¼ 1192; Labour n ¼ 1180; Liberal Democrat n ¼ 730; UKIP
n¼ 784; Green n¼ 895; SNP n¼ 963). YouGov recruited the survey
respondents from a panel of around 300,000 volunteers who are
paid a fee of 50p for completing a survey. Upon joining the YouGov
panel volunteers complete a survey asking a broad range of de-
mographic questions which are subsequently used to recruit re-
spondents matching desired demographic quotas for surveys.
Potential respondents for the party member survey were identiﬁed
from questions asking individuals if they were members of any of a
list of large membership organisations, including the political
parties. At the beginning of the ﬁeldwork period some 8840 You-
Gov panellists who were party members were eligible to take part
in the poll, of whom 5696 respondents subsequently took part in
the survey, effectively a response rate of 64.4 percent. Results re-
ported in this article are not weighted in any way since there are no
known ofﬁcial population parameters for the various party mem-
berships. However, YouGov party membership surveys using un-
weighted data have generated predictions for party leadership
contests that come very close (that is within 1%) to the ﬁnal ofﬁcial
outcome, which gives us conﬁdence in the quality of the data.2
Further validation was provided by comparing demographics of
3 Note that, contrary to Fisher et al. (2014) and Gauja and Jackson (2016), we
prefer a threefold distinction of campaign activities into low-, medium- and high-
intensity. This is because activities like displaying a poster or supporting the party
on the web (low-intensity activity) clearly require less effort than leaﬂetting or
attending a party meeting (medium-intensity activity).
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(n ¼ 13,568) conducted by Paul Whiteley and Matthew Goodwin
using a mailback method. We are grateful to Professors Whiteley
and Goodwin for facilitating this. The non-member supporters
survey was conducted by YouGov in June and July 2015, with the
sample drawn in a similar fashion from the British Election Study
panel. Speciﬁcally, some 6378 respondents who identiﬁed them-
selves as ‘very strong’ identiﬁers with the Conservatives (n¼ 1142),
Labour (n ¼ 1136), the Liberal Democrats (n ¼ 1004), the SNP
(n¼ 996), the Greens (n¼ 1029) or UKIP (n¼ 1071) constituted our
sample. The data are drawn from a national British Election Study
(BES) sample that is weighted by age, gender, social class, and re-
gion for each group of identiﬁers and the strength of identiﬁcation.
Henceforth in this article references to ‘supporters’ should be un-
derstood to refer to these very strong partisan identiﬁers who are
not party members.
Although party members and party supporters are different, in
that the former have gone a step further than the latter by formally
joining a political party, the substantive distinction between the
two can be harder to pin down. Duverger (1964: 62), for instance,
pointed out that whereas it is the case that a supporter ‘remains
outside the organisation and the community it forms’, the differ-
ence with party members ‘blurs and at times disappears’. One
reason for this is that members are often inactive, and are now
rarely driven to join parties to obtain material beneﬁts (Van Haute,
2011; Van Haute and Gauja, 2015). Moreover, comparing members
and supporters of the Green Party in Australia, Gauja and Jackson
(2016) found that although active members are distinct in several
respects from supporters, there is relatively little difference be-
tween inactive members and active supporters. This point is
underlined in Ponce and Scarrow's evidence that ‘behaviourally
deﬁned’ understandings of members are able to identify ‘a rela-
tively homogenous group of active partisans’ which includes sup-
porters who might not be active within their party, but whose
general political engagement implies they can play a signiﬁcant
‘ambassadorial’ role in ‘spreading the party message’ (2016:
684e685).
Despite the similarities, however, on the whole, the number of
activities carried out by an average member will tend to be higher
than the number carried out by an average party supporter. Beyond
this, party members and supporters might tend to participate in
different activities (Duverger, 1964: 116). Thus, party members can
be expected to participate more in activities most obviously asso-
ciated with formal membership, such as party meetings or intra-
party decision making. Moreover, as Gauja and Jackson (2016),
building on the research of Seyd and Whiteley (1992, 2002) and
Whiteley at al. (1994, 2006) suggest, if we distinguish between low-
and high-intensity activity, we might expect the two groups to
participate in different forms of activities at election time: sup-
porters will be more likely to undertake expressive low-intensity
activities (such as displaying posters or, nowadays, putting in a
good word for the party via social media [Aldrich et al, 2015]),
whereas members will be more likely to undertake high-intensity
activities, such as door-to-door and phone canvassing (Duverger,
1964: 101). More speciﬁcally in the UK context, previous research
by Fisher and his colleagues found that:
… supporters were quite likely to staff polling stations relative
to members, and were perhaps surprisingly likely to be involved
at the campaign headquarters, despite not being formal mem-
bers. However, in respect of other activities where voters were
contacted either on the doorstep or by telephone, supporters
were less likely to be involved than members (2014: 83).
Based on this literature, we can already identify threehypotheses worth testing:
H1. Individuals who are members of political parties will, on
average, do more for those parties during election campaigns than
individuals who strongly support those same parties but are not
actually members.
H2. Notwithstanding the greater propensity of party members to
undertake campaign activity than non-member supporters at the
individual level, the aggregate-level input of the latter group will
match or exceed that of party members because of their greater
numbers in the adult population.
H3. The more ‘high-intensity’ the campaign activities, the more
pronounced the difference between members and supporters, to
the advantage of the former.3
After testing these expectations regarding the levels and type of
participation at election time of the two different groups, we
explore the demographic and attitudinal correlates of their
campaign activism. In the light of previous research on political
participation and party membership (Verba and Nie, 1972; Seyd
and Whiteley, 2002: 44e47), we should expect that, among both
members and supporters, those most active during the campaign
will be those who are more highly-educated, male, more middle-
class, and middle aged (after which activism tends to decline
again). Yet previous research in the UK (Fisher et al., 2014) has
found that, at the constituency-level, there is an inconsistent
relationship between demographic factors and activism across the
two groups, and across the various parties. For the Conservatives,
the proportions of graduates and owner occupiers in a constituency
predicted the campaign input of members, while the proportion of
manual workers inﬂuenced the activity of supporters. For Labour, an
ethnically diverse populationwas a signiﬁcant predictor ofmember
activity, but population density correlated with supporter activity.
Several features of the constituency's demographic proﬁle (an
ethnically diverse population and proportions of graduates, owner-
occupiers and council or housing association tenants) impacted on
the campaign activity of Liberal Democrat supporters e but none of
these mattered when it came to the party's members (Fisher et al.,
2014, 86e89). The same research also found that the presence of
Black andMinority Ethnic (BAME) candidates boosted Conservative
supporters' activity but not members' activity, while having female
candidates correlated positively with Labour members' activism,
but not with that of their supporters. Based on these ﬁndings, then,
we put forward a fourth hypothesis:
H4. There will be no consistent link between socio-demographic
characteristics and campaign activism, whether we are talking
about party members or supporters.
As for political attitudes, May's (1973) ‘law’ of curvilinear
disparity holds that party members, on the whole, are more ideo-
logically zealous than are party elites or voters (but see e.g. Norris,
1995). Given this, Gauja and Jackson (2016) suggest that party sup-
porters might occupy a mid-way position between party members
and voters. They ﬁnd, however, only mixed support for that idea.
Interestingly, other scholars have taken a different approach,
focusingonpartymemberswho identify themselves as ideologically
at odds with the party (e.g. Van Haute and Carty, 2011), as they
perceive an ideological distance or a gap between their party and
themselves. It has been suggested, for instance, that this ‘ideological
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at elections or, if the gap is unbridgeable, even to leave the party
altogether (K€ollnandPolk, 2017). In the caseof campaignactivity,we
might therefore expect that higher levels of ideological incongru-
ence could also lead party members to be less engaged during the
electoral campaign, and that this ideological gapmight have similar
effects on party supporters. We do not expect, in other words,
ideological disagreement with the party to have different implica-
tions for campaigning efforts for the two groups.
Nor have we any prima facie reason to expect differences be-
tween the two groups when it comes to other political attitudes
that we suspect may affect participation in campaigning, namely,
social liberalism, postmaterialism, and (given its salience in the UK
context at the time) attitudes to the EU. Since liberalism places
greater emphasis on democratic engagement as a civic right and a
preferred value that maximises liberty and enhances political
knowledge on the part of citizens (Howarth, 2007), we expect both
party members and supporters who are more socially liberal to
engage more in campaigning. Similarly, as post-materialist values
emphasise self-actualization and self-expression through demo-
cratic participation (Inglehart, 1977; Klingemann and Fuchs, 1995:
16e17), we would also expect to ﬁnd a positive relationship be-
tween post-materialist orientation and campaign activism among
members and supporters. In addition, we would expect citizens
with a decided opinion on the question of the UK's membership of
the EU to regard it as highly salient and therefore an important
reason to campaign, either in the hope of winning support for a
pro-referendum or anti-referendum party or candidate. Individuals
who showed less determinate views on EUmembership at the time
of the election would not be expected to be driven to participate by
this issue, however. All this produces the following hypothesis:
H5. Ideological incongruence will lead to lower participation,
whereas being socially liberal, postmaterialist, or having decided
views on the Brexit referendum debate will each lead to higher
participation in the election campaign. These expectations
regarding political attitudes can be expected to hold equally for
members and supporters.
Finally, constituency contextual factors might also inﬂuence the
decision to participate in electoral campaigns for both members
and supporters. Fisher and colleagues found, for instance, that the
prospect of victory or possible defeat in a seat prompted more ac-
tivity by both members and supporters (Fisher et al., 2014: 86). By
the same token, we expect that the marginality of a seat will lead
both groups to participate more, in part because constituencies
which are likely to produce closer races are where parties tend to
focus their mobilization efforts, and in part because individuals willTable 1
Social and political characteristics of British political party members, 2015.
Attribute Con Lab LD
Mean age M 54 51 5
S 57 52 5
% male M 71.2 61.6 6
S 51.6 49.6 4
% graduates M 37.9 56.3 5
S 25.3 29.8 4
% ABC1 M 74.6 69.7 7
S 68.6 51.9 6
Mean left-right M 7.76 2.39 4
S 7.53 2.97 4
N M 1193 1180 7
S 1142 1136 1
Notes: M: Members, S: Supporters. Left-right (self-location) ¼ mean self-placement on acalculate that the marginal impact of their campaign efforts on the
election outcome in the constituency is likely to be greater.
H6. Party members and strong supporters of political parties will
be more likely to involve themselves in campaign activities when
they live in constituencies which are expected to produce closer
electoral races.4. Patterns of campaign activism among party members and
supporters
Before engaging directly with tests of these hypotheses, we start
by brieﬂy surveying some basic descriptive statistics relating to the
demographic and political proﬁle of our samples of party members
and party supporters. Table 1 reveals few differences across these
two sets of respondents in terms of their age proﬁles. It is also
apparent that party members are more likely to be male than their
counterparts among supporters; indeed, the differences are quite
sharp in all cases. Party members are, on average, muchmore likely
to be educated to graduate level than non-member supporters,
with Labour, Liberal Democrats and Greens being the most highly
educated in these terms, and Ukippers the least. Party members are
also generally more likely to be from non-manual occupational
grades than supporters; Liberal Democrats and Conservatives are
the most middle-class in this sense, and once again, Ukippers are
the least. In terms of subjective self-location on the left-right scale,
it is striking but perhaps not too surprising (in view of May's Law)
that party members are, without exception, more radical (in the
sense of being closer to one end of the ideological spectrum or the
other) than their supporter counterparts: that is, Labour, Green,
SNP and even Liberal Democrat members all regard themselves as
more leftewing than do supporters of their parties, while Conser-
vative and UKIP members are both further to the right. The relative
ordering of mean scores for the parties is identical within each of
samples: from left to right it runs fromGreen to Labour, SNP, Liberal
Democrat, UKIP and Conservative.
Moreover, as suggested previously, parties have some kind of
general mobilizational advantage in having members and strong
partisan identiﬁers. We ﬁnd for instance that the stronger a
respondent professes his or her partisan identity to be, the more
likely they are to vote loyally for ‘their’ party in the actual election
(Table I in Appendix), and that party members are - with the
exception of the SNP e even more loyal to their party than non-
member partisans (Table II in Appendix).
What are the campaign activities that each of these different
groups of actors undertakes? Table 2 addresses this question by
revealing the range and number of campaign activities that theyUKIP Green SNP Total
1 58 42 49 51
0 56 41 52 52
8.5 75.9 57.5 56.4 65.0
3.2 55.9 35.9 51.5 48.1
5.8 23.1 56.4 41.7 45.4
4.6 13.3 48.5 28.4 31.3
6.0 59.9 65.2 61.9 68.2
7.5 43.0 55.9 46.9 55.7
.10 7.34 1.90 2.96 4.44
.40 6.77 2.40 3.65 4.66
30 785 845 963 5696
004 1071 1029 996 6378
scale running from 0 (left-wing) to 10 (right-wing).
Table 2
Which of the following things did you do for the party during the 2015 election campaign?.
Activity Con Lab LD UKIP Green SNP Total
Activism Index M 2.15 2.56 2.38 2.28 2.43 3.02 2.47
S 0.25 0.48 0.42 0.37 0.79 0.80 0.51
‘Liked’ something by party/cand. on FB M 39.6 51.1 47.4 44.2 67.6 72.7 53.4
S 10.2 18.8 14.8 17.2 35.5 31.2 21.0
Tweeted/re-tweeted something by party M 26.0 36.9 31.1 22.9 45.7 48.6 35.2
S 3.4 7.8 7.8 4.4 18.5 10.4 8.6
Displayed election poster in window M 29.6 51.2 37.8 42.9 45.1 67.7 45.7
S 2.5 10.7 6.0 8.1 9.5 21.1 9.5
Delivered leaﬂets M 43.5 42.5 45.9 38.3 28.8 35.4 39.4
S 2.4 3.0 3.8 1.6 2.4 2.6 2.6
Attended public meeting or hustings M 31.3 31.4 28.2 40.5 27.3 49.0 34.6
S 4.2 4.8 6.8 3.4 8.7 12.6 6.6
Canvassed face to face or by phone M 36.5 35.7 32.6 26.1 19.1 28.2 30.4
S 1.6 2.4 2.2 2.1 4.0 2.4 2.4
Stood as candidate (parliamentary or local) M 9.1 7.0 15.1 13.0 10.2 0.2 8.6
S 0.6 0.1 0.6 0.2 0.3 0.0 0.3
Number M 1193 1180 730 785 845 963 5696
S 1142 1136 1004 1070 1029 996 6337
Note: M ¼members; S ¼ supporters. Campaign activism index is based on an additive scale that runs from 0 (no activity during the election campaign) to 7 (maximal activity
during the campaign, excluding “other”). All activities ﬁgures are percentages.
Table 3
Estimates of mean number of campaign activities by party members and very strong partisans, 2015.
Con Lab LD UKIP Green SNP Total
1. Estimates of national totals, 2015
Members 150,000 188,000 51,000 42,000 61,000 110,000 602,000
Supporters 3,061,993 3,883,464 446,623 636,577 165,192 659,054 8,852,903
2. Activism index (0e7)
Members 2.15 2.56 2.38 2.28 2.43 3.02 2.47
Supporters 0.25 0.48 0.42 0.37 0.79 0.80 0.51
3. Mean total number of campaign activities
Members 322,500 481,280 121,380 95,760 148,230 332,200 1,486,940
Supporters 765,498 1,864,063 187,582 235,533 130,502 527,243 4,514,981
Note: ‘Members’¼ number of political party members at time of May, 2015 general election, or as near as possible thereof. ‘Supporters’¼ projected numbers of non-members
who are ‘very strong’ partisan identiﬁers for each party, based on BES 2015 Internet Panel (post-election), Wave 6.0; the number of party members is then subtracted from this
ﬁgure in order to avoid double-counting, given thatmost partymembers are also highly likely to designate themselves ‘very strong’ partisan identiﬁers.4 In the third part of the
table, each ﬁgure is the mean number of campaign activities reported by each group (as indicated by the campaign activism index in part 2 of the table), multiplied by the
estimated number of people the group (as reported in part 1 of the table). The ﬁgures may therefore be interpreted as the minimum overall number of campaign activities
conducted by each group.
4 Calculations of number of non-member supporters are as follows: Based on
45,238,492 registered electors in May, 2015;Percentage of very strong Conservative
partisan identiﬁers ¼ 7.1% of BES sample (3,211,933) e 150,000 party
members ¼ 3,061,933; Percentage of very strong Labour partisan identiﬁers ¼ 9.0%
of BES sample (4.071,464) e 188,000 party members ¼ 3,883,464; Percentage of
very strong Liberal Democrat partisan identiﬁers ¼ 1.1% of BES sample (497, 623) e
51,000 party members ¼ 446,623; Percentage of very strong UKIP partisan
identiﬁers ¼ 1.5% of BES sample (678, 577) e 42,000 party members ¼ 636,577;
Percentage of very strong Green partisan identiﬁers ¼ 0.5% of BES sample (226, 192)
e 61,000 party members ¼ 165,192; Percentage of very strong SNP partisan
identiﬁers ¼ 1.7% of BES sample (769, 054) e 110,000 party members ¼ 659,054.
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striking feature of this table is that, as we expected, full members of
political parties are far more active on average than non-member
supporters. This is shown by the summary campaign activism in-
dex scores, constructed at the individual-level by adding 1 for each
campaign activity (out of the 7 asked about in the survey) declared
by respondents. A score of 0 indicates no activity whereas a score of
7 indicates maximum campaign effort. The overall activism index
mean for party members is 2.47, almost ﬁve times higher than that
registered by party supporters, which comes out at 0.51. This gap
between members and supporters is similar across parties, ranging
from 1.64 for Greens to 2.22 for the SNP. The size of the gap is
largely due to the fact that, on average, about 70% of party sup-
porters were completely inactive, compared to about 20% of party
members. Even looking at each campaign activity individually, in all
cases and across all parties, party members participate far more
than party supporters. Thus, we can conﬁdently conclude that, on
the whole, party members remain vitally important campaign re-
sources for political parties, who are much more readily mobilized
on behalf of their candidates during elections. This clearly conﬁrms
H1 (that members will be more active than supporters).
However, while this is undeniably true when we compare therelative rates of activity undertaken by these two groups, it must be
borne in mind that the story may be quite different when we
consider the overall impact of that activity on election campaigns at
the aggregate level. In other words, we have to take into account
the fact that in Britain, as is the case throughout Europe (see
Hooghe and Kern, 2015: 953), parties attract far more supporters
than members. Consequently, their overall contribution to
campaign activity might rival that of party members. A few simple
calculations can provide us with estimates of the overall input of
each group in the 2015 general election.
The ﬁrst section of Table 3 estimates the numbers of each of
Table 4
Intensity of campaign activities: Low, Medium and High Intensity of Activity (%).
Intensity of campaign activities Con Lab LD UKIP Green SNP Total
Low-Intensity M 57.4 75.3 67.4 65.0 80.6 87.6 72.0
S 13.5 26.5 21.9 23.1 43.1 41.9 28.0
Ratio M/S 4.3 2.8 3.1 2.8 1.9 2.1 2.6
Medium-Intens. M 52.5 52.2 52.8 51.1 38.5 56.2 51.0
S 6.3 7.0 9.4 4.3 10.3 14.3 8.5
Ratio M/S 8.3 7.5 5.6 11.9 3.7 3.9 6
High-Intensity M 38.0 37.0 36.0 30.0 23.7 28.2 32.6
S 2.0 2.4 2.8 2.3 4.1 2.4 2.7
Ratio M/S 19.0 15.4 12.9 13.0 5.8 11.8 12.1
N M 1193 1180 730 785 845 963 5696
S 1142 1136 1004 1070 1029 996 6337
Note: M ¼members; S ¼ supporters. Low intensity activity includes liking a party or candidate on Facebook, Tweeting something positive for or about the party or candidate,
or displaying a poster. Medium intensity activity includes delivering party leaﬂets and attending public meetings. High intensity activity includes canvassing voters and
standing as a candidate.
5 These items are coded as follows: Gender: 1 (male), 2 (female); Education: 1
(No qualiﬁcations), 2 (Junior vocational qualiﬁcations), 3 (CSE), 4 (GCSE, O levels,
etc.), 5 (A levels/Scottish highers), 6 (Higher vocational qualiﬁcations), 7 (Grad-
uate); Social grade: 1 (C2DE e ie, manual employee), 2 (ABC1 e ie, non-manual
employee); Age: Respondent's age in years, divided by 10 to ease interpretation
(change for a 10-year difference shown), so that it now runs from 0 to 10; Age
squared.
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campaigners in the run-up to the election. The number of members
that each party had in May 2015 (or as close as possible to that
time) is taken from Keen (2015). The number of non-member
supporters each party might have been able to call upon is esti-
mated by taking the percentages of the overall BES post-election
sample who are ‘very strong’ partisans for each party, and then
calculating what this would amount to in terms of the UK's
45,325,078 registered electors in 2015. Given that there were more
than 8.8 million very strong partisans in the electorate (just under a
ﬁfth), compared to just 600,000 party members, it is obvious that
the parties might have beneﬁted hugely from former, notwith-
standing their much lower rates of campaign activity at the indi-
vidual level.
Just how much this is the case is shown in the third section of
the same table, which multiplies the mean score on the campaign
activism index (shown in Table 2 and in the second section of
Table 3) by the number of people in each group. The ﬁgures can be
interpreted as estimates of the minimum total number of campaign
activities performed by party members and non-member partisans
respectively on behalf of ‘their’ parties; ‘minimum’ because, of
course, our respondents were only asked whether or not they had
performed each of these activities e but not how often they had
done so. Even allowing for this caveat, it is apparent that non-
member supporters may well have contributed more activity
overall during the 2015 election campaign, having performed a
minimum total of 4.5million activities altogether. By contrast, party
members only managed a minimum of just under 1.5 million ac-
tivities. Labour in particular seems to have beneﬁted from the input
of non-member supporters. This conﬁrms H2 and reinforces one of
the major claims made by Fisher and his colleagues (2014) con-
cerning the importance of non-members for campaigning activity.
Of course, none of this takes account of the speciﬁc nature of
different types of campaign activity: close inspection of the pattern
of the ﬁndings reported in Table 2 reveals that partymembers are at
a particular premiumwhen it comes to the more intensive forms of
campaign activity such as canvassing and delivering leaﬂets. For
instance, whereas party members were only 2.5 times more likely
than non-member supporters to have ‘liked’ something for their
party on Facebook, they were 12 times more likely to have
canvassed and 15 times more likely to have delivered campaign
leaﬂets. In order to look at this more systematically, in Table 4 we
have distinguished between low-intensity, medium-intensity and
high-intensity activities, summarizing participation in these terms.
In terms of time and effort, our classiﬁcation of low intensity ac-
tivities includes ‘liking something by party/candidate on Facebook’,
‘Tweeting/re-tweeting something by party or candidate’ and ‘dis-
playing election poster in window’ (i.e., all things that can be donewithout actually leaving one's home); our medium-intensity ac-
tivity category includes ‘delivering leaﬂets’ and ‘attending public
meetings or hustings’ (campaign actions which require one to
physically leave the home); while our high intensity category in-
cludes ‘canvassing face to face or by phone’ and ‘standing as a
(parliamentary or local) candidate’ (i.e., things that require direct
personal interaction with voters as ambassadors for the party).
The general impression does not change. For instance, whereas
party members were about two-and-a-half times more likely to
have participated in low intensity activity than party supporters,
they were six times more likely to have participated in medium
intensity activity, and twelve times more likely to have participated
in high intensity activity. On this latter point, however, we should
note that high intensity activities are often effectively reserved for
members, so it is hardly a surprise that supporters score very low
on these activities. Clearly, then, the higher the ‘cost’ to the indi-
vidual in terms of time and effort, the more likely that party
members rather than non-members will deliver campaign activity
on behalf of their parties. This offers broad conﬁrmation of H3,
namely that the gap between members and supporters will grow
with the intensity of campaign activity.
In brief, while this analysis conﬁrms the multi-speed member-
ship idea that adherents who are more loosely connected to parties
than full members may be valuable as human resources in election
campaigns, it also points to the continuing centrality of the formal
membership for core activities which are vital to electoral
mobilization.5. Modelling activism: Are members and non-members
motivated by the same factors?
We now turn to the second major aim of this paper e to ﬁnd out
what factors inﬂuence campaign activism and whether they differ
between members and supporters. In order to do this we create
models of activism that enable us to compare and contrast the
factors that motivate these two sets of actors to campaign during
elections. Speciﬁcally, we look at socio-demographic (H4), ideo-
logical (H5) and constituency (H6) factors, while controlling for
party effects.
The socio-demographic characteristics we measure5 include
9 The winning majority has been divided by 10 to make a change of 1 unit more
readily interpretable compared to other independent variables in the models (i.e.
coefﬁcients indicate the effect of a change of 10 percentage point in the winning
majority).
10 The excluded high-intensity activities are canvassing and standing as candi-
dates; by deﬁnition, the latter can only apply to those who are full members, while
parties are often loath to include non-members as canvassers for fear that they
might be ‘loose cannons’ who are not fully cognisant of accepted canvassing pro-
cedure or party policies. The ﬁve activities that count towards the dependent
variable are therefore: liking a party or candidate on Facebook, Tweeting something
positive for or about the party or candidate, displaying a poster, delivering party
leaﬂets and attending public meetings. Note that we considered whether a
weighted dependent variable taking into account different costs of activities would
be appropriate. However, since results were extremely similar to those shown and
it was not completely intuitively clear what it would mean to apply weights to the
number of different activities carried out in campaign, we present results for the
unweighted variable. Factor analysis run for each party in the party members and
supporters datasets conﬁrms that a single latent factor underlies the ﬁve activities.
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terminants of activism aremeasured using various scales which tap
ideological dimensions widely recognised as salient features of
contemporary British politics:
(a) Ideological incongruence is measured by taking the absolute
difference between respondents' left-right self-position and
that which they ascribe to their national party (both
measured on a 0 ¼ left to 10 ¼ right scale). The measure of
ideological incongruence runs from zero (minimum ideo-
logical incongruence; i.e. no gap between respondent and
party) to 10 (maximum ideological incongruence; i.e.
maximum distance between respondent and party). We as-
sume that those who perceive a higher ideological distance
between themselves and their party will be less willing to
campaign on behalf of it.
(b) Social liberalism-authoritarianism is measured by a standard
additive index running from zero (representing the liberal
end of the scale) to 10 (representing the authoritarian end)
(Heath et al., 1993). This is highly reliable.7 Our assumption
here is that respondents who are more socially liberal will be
more likely to participate in campaigns.
(c) Post-materialism is measured by an index that uses a classic
Inglehartian measurement based on four policy objectives
about which respondents are invited to express their pref-
erences.8 Respondents selecting the two materialist options
as their ﬁrst and second priorities are designatedmaterialists
(coded as 1), while those selecting the two post-materialist
options are designated as post-materialists (coded as 3),
and everyone else is deemed to be attitudinally ‘mixed’ on
this dimension of belief (coded as 2). We would expect to
ﬁnd a positive relationship between post-materialist orien-
tation and campaign activism.
(d) Attitude towards Britain's relationship with Europe is
measured by a question about the referendum on UK
membership of the EU: ‘If there were a referendum on EU
membership prior to the next general election, how would
you vote?’ If respondents indicated a preference for leaving
or staying in regardless of any renegotiated terms of mem-
bership that the governmentmight achieve, theywere coded
as 1; if they indicated that their decision would depend on
the outcome of negotiations they were coded as 0. Wewould
expect those who had deﬁnite views on Brexit to be more
likely to participate in campaign efforts.
As regards H6, in order to determine whether a race is close we
look at marginality, measured using the winning majority of the
local MP in 2010, with an index that runs from zero (0%majority) to6 There is evidence that older individuals up to their forties or ﬁfties tend to
participate more in political action, after which age activism tends to decline again
(Milbrath, 1965: 135).
7 The individual items from which the Liberty-Authority scale is constructed are
as follows: “Young people today don't have enough respect for traditional values”;
“People who break the law should be given stiffer sentences”; “For some crimes the
death penalty is the most appropriate sentence”; “Schools should teach children to
obey authority”; “Censorship of ﬁlms and magazines is necessary to uphold moral
standards”. Responses are coded so that 1 is the most socially liberal option and 5
the most socially authoritarian option. The resulting scores are normalized and
multiplied by 10 so that the ﬁnal scale runs from 0 to 10. Cronbach's alpha for these
ﬁve items in the party membership data ¼ 0.846, and in the non-member sup-
porters data it ¼ 0.837, which indicates consistently high levels of scale reliability
across the two datasets.
8 Two items (maintaining order in the nation, and ﬁghting unemployment)
constitute materialist preferences and two items (giving people more say in
important government decisions, and protecting freedom of speech) constitute
post-materialist preferences.10 (100% majority).9
Our main dependent variable is the summary campaign
activism index score. However, given the extremelywide difference
between members and supporters in the high-intensity activities,
essentially because those activities are largely reserved for mem-
bers, in order to make members and supporters more comparable
this time we employ a version of the index that only takes into
account the low- and medium-intensity campaign activities
(running from zero to ﬁve and based on the number of different
activities carried out), which aims to capture the breadth of
activism at the 2015 general election.10 We treat it as a count var-
iable and run negative binomial regression analysis on it, the most
appropriate statistical analysis tool for an over-dispersed count
outcome (Long, 1997).11 We also use clustered standard errors at
the constituency level to take into account the different level of
measurement of the marginality variable.
In Table 5 we run equivalent models for members and partisan
supporters that incorporate demographics (H4), ideological factors
(H5), and constituency marginality (H6) as independent variables.
In each of these models, using the SNP as the reference category
(the party with the highest mean scores on the activism scale for
both members and supporters), we include dummy variables for
the party to which respondents belong (for party members) or
strongly identify with (for party supporters), in order to control for
party effects.12 In the model for party supporters we also employ a
dummy variable in order to control for party supporters who were
previously party members, since we expect these to be less likely to
participate in the campaign given their decision to abandon their
parties. Table 5 reports the Incident-Rate Ratio coefﬁcients (IRRs),
which are the key parameter estimates for negative binomial
regression.13 To get a sense of the substantive meaning of the11 Count variables can be modelled using either Poisson regression or negative
binomial regression. They both have the same mean structure, but negative bino-
mial also has an extra parameter (alpha) to model over-dispersion (i.e. when the
conditional variance exceeds the conditional mean). In our case, negative binomial
regression was deemed more appropriate due to a signiﬁcant overdispersion in the
campaign participation index of party supporters (The Likelihood Ratio test (121.64,
1 df, p < 0.001); comparing the full negative binomial model to a Poisson model
shows that Alpha is non-zero (Long and Freese, 2006)).
12 All else being equal, models conﬁrms that members and non-members of every
party participated in signiﬁcantly fewer activities than members and supporters of
the SNP. The gap with SNP participation is particularly evident for Liberal Democrat
and Conservative party supporters, and, to a lesser extent, for Labour and UKIP
supporters.
13 As with odds ratios (OR) in binomial logistic regression, IRRs are the expo-
nentials of the Poisson and negative binomial regression coefﬁcients (exp (b)) and
they are often used for ease of interpretation (a coefﬁcient higher than 1 corre-
sponds to a positive relationship, whereas a coefﬁcient lower than 1 corresponds to
a negative one). The Poisson and negative binomial regression coefﬁcients have an
additive effect in the log(y) scale, while the incident-rate ratio coefﬁcients (IRR)
have a multiplicative effect in the y scale.
Table 5
Explanatory models for breadth of political participation during election campaign.
Dependent variable: (1) Party members (2) Party supporters
Campaign activism IRR s. e. IRR s. e.
Demographics
Female (ref: male) 1.043** (0.020) 1.176*** (0.056)
Education (1 lowest e 7 highest) 0.986** (0.007) 1.019 (0.015)
ABC1 (vs. C2DE) 0.949** (0.046) 0.992 (0.050)
Age 1.249*** (0.046) 0.855* (0.073)
Age squared 0.972*** (0.004) 1.004 (0.009)
Previous party member 0.533*** (0.030)
Ideology
Ideological Incongruence (0e10) 0.979** (0.009) 1.037** (0.019)
Liberty-Authority Index (0e10) 0.969*** (0.006) 0.971** (0.013)
Post-Materialism Index (1e3) 1.105*** (0.018) 1.203*** (0.049)
Clear views on EU (ref: unclear views) 1.121*** (0.034) 1.167** (0.066)
Marginality
Majority % in 2010 (0e10) 0.985* (0.009) 0.965* (0.019)
Political Party
Conservative 0.783* (0.031) 0.333*** (0.032)
Labour 0.780*** (0.024) 0.566*** (0.045)
Lib Dem 0.691*** (0.027) 0.463*** (0.039)
UKIP 0.782*** (0.032) 0.519*** (0.044)
Greens 0.717*** (0.025) 0.728*** (0.052)
Constant 1.940*** (0.214) 2.792 (0.789)
Alphaa 0.010 (0.012) 0.523*** (0.065)
N (Individuals, Constituencies) 5071, 622 4763, 627
Log Likelihood 8938.06 4362.28
AIC 3.532 1.840
BIC 25232.51 31441.16
Notes: Incident-Rate Ratio (IRR) are displayed, s.e. in parentheses; clustered standard errors at constituency level are calculated. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
a Alpha is the over-dispersion parameter. If signiﬁcant, the data is over-dispersed and negative binomial is more appropriate than Poisson model.
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number of activities for members and supporters with speciﬁc
socio-demographic, attitudinal and contextual characteristics for
each political party.
We can see that for party members (Model 1) all demographic
characteristics signiﬁcantly inﬂuence campaign activism. Except for
age, however, they do so in unexpected ways. As predicted, on
average, and controlling for all other variables in the model, the
older a member, the wider the range of campaign activities he or
she undertakes. This is true, however, until members reach their
forties, when their participation in campaign activities starts to
decline. However, surprisingly, the party members who put the
most effort into campaign activities tend to be female, less
educated and of lower social grade. For party supporters (Model 2)
it is only gender and age that make a difference e but also in un-
expected directions: again it is females rather than men, and young
people rather than older ones who tend to participate more. What
explains all this is hard to pin down. It is perhaps the case that the
usual demographic effects do not apply to party members as a
group, since these are people who are already highly politically
interested. Indeed, it may be an indication of their unusually high
political motivation that females, lower social grade and younger
people who join parties are prepared to do so even though they are
not demographically typical of party members in general. That is,
they join parties and participate in spite of their demographic
proﬁle rather than because of it, which suggests a high level of
motivation. Whatever the reason, what we can say is that the
inconsistency we observe is similar to that reported in the
constituency-level analysis of Fisher et al. (2014), and therefore
essentially conﬁrms H4. We might also observe that ex-members
are signiﬁcantly less likely to be active than other partysupporters, all other things being held constant; this should not
surprise us, since the very fact that they have left their parties in-
dicates a degree of disappointment or disillusionment with party
politics.
When we look at ideology (H5), we can see that both groups do
more campaigning when they have decided views on the EU and
when they hold more socially liberal values. Being more post-
materialist than materialist is also a signiﬁcant and positive
driver of campaign participation for party members and party
supporters. Thus far, H5 is conﬁrmed. However, while the ideo-
logical incongruence between the respondent's left-right self-
placement and ‘their’ party (at a national level) matters both for
party members and party supporters, the effect runs in different
directions, which is a surprise: the greater the distance, the lower
the participation of party members in the campaign, which makes
intuitive sense and is as we expected; somewhat paradoxically,
however, greater perceived ideological distance actually seems to
spur non-member supporters to a wider range of participatory
activities.
On closer examination this seems to reﬂect the fact that, among
the ranks of the most active supporters we ﬁnd a substantial group
of people who are ideologically quite radical yet see themselves as
distant from the party leadership. This sense of distance might well
be a reason for their not joining the party in the ﬁrst place, of course
(although we have no direct evidence of this), but it is interesting
that they are nevertheless prepared to work for it. When all is said
and done, such ideologues might still feel that the party they
campaign for is the best option available, notwithstanding its
perceived shortcomings. This is best illustrated by reference to
Labour's supporters. Examination of the available evidence shows
two things that may be relevant here (see Table 6). First, apart from
Table 6
Labour supporters' self-location on left-right scale and perceived left-right distance from the party, by activism level.
Campaign activism scale score Labour supporters
Mean left-right location Left-right distance from party
0 3.15 (702) 1.35 (670)
1 2.85 (185) 1.51 (183)
2 2.24 (97) 1.75 (97)
3 1.75 (28) 2.36 (28)
4 3.67 (6) 2.83 (6)
5 e e
Total 2.97 (1018) 1.46 (984)
Note: Figures in parenthesis ¼ number of cases.
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scale, the more active these non-member supporters are, the more
left wing they feel themselves to be. Second, the more active that
supporters are, the greater their ideological incongruence with the
party (i.e., the greater the left-right gap they perceive between
themselves and the party). Thus, it would seem that greater left-
right distance is associated with higher levels of activism among
the party's non-member supporters largely because of the presence
of ideological radicals among their ranks.14
Overall, we would argue that the ﬁndings pertaining to attitu-
dinal inﬂuences largely conﬁrm H5, in that their inﬂuence is
broadly similar across party members and supporters (especially in
respect of social liberalism, post-materialism and European inte-
gration), with the exception of ideological incongruence. When we
turn to the ﬁnal predictor in our models, the marginality of the
constituency that respondents live in, we see that the safer a seat is,
the less inclined both party members and party supporters are to
participate in the campaign. This is straightforward and clear
conﬁrmation of H6.
By way of summarizing our ﬁndings pertaining to hypotheses 4
to 6, we can say that all of our hypothetical expectations are borne
out by the data bar the inverse ﬁndings relating to perceived left-
right distance from the national party of members and sup-
porters. In short, while demography and left-right ideological
incongruence work in various and inconsistent ways, being more
socially liberal, more post-materialist and having clear views on the
EU all impel bothmembers and supporters to involve themselves in
campaign activities, as does living in a marginal constituency.6. Conclusion
Party supporters are increasingly the target of multi-speed
membership parties. Since individuals have long appeared to be
less willing to commit to formal membership, party supporters
must be seen as a potential alternative source of popular legitimacy
and organisational signiﬁcance for parties. When considering this
broader pool of grassroots activists, however, it is important to take
into account the differences between the two groups as well as the
similarities. Thanks to our contemporaneous surveys of party
members and supporters straight after the 2015 General Election,
we have been able to investigate similarities and differences in the
campaign activity of the two groups in the British context, as well
examining the demographic, attitudinal and contextual drivers of
participation.
To summarise our major ﬁndings, we have seen that, at the in-
dividual level, members of political parties are far more likely to
engage in campaign activity on behalf of their party than are people14 Similar ﬁndings apply to Conservative non-member supporters, albeit to a less
pronounced degree. Details available from authors on request.who support that party but who do not formally belong to it. The
size of this ‘campaign activism gap’ varies according to the intensity
of the form of activity: the more intensive an activity is in terms of
time and effort involved, the greater the input of party members
relative to non-member supporters. This notwithstanding, at the
aggregate level the overall impact of campaign work undertaken by
non-member supporters might very well be as great as (or even
greater than) that of party members, given the far larger number of
people who simply support parties rather than actually belong to
them. In trying to understand what inﬂuences people in each of
these groups to involve themselves in election campaigns, we have
found that the constituency context is likely to be important: for
both party members and supporters, the closer the constituency
race is expected to be, the more likely that they will be active. We
have also seen that political attitudes are generally inﬂuential:
social liberalism, post-materialism and clear-cut feelings about the
EU all incline people to be more active in election campaigns;
perceived left-right congruence with the national party also in-
clines party members to participate more, although not supporters.
Demographic inﬂuences on campaign activity are not obvious, bar
the ﬁnding that women are the most active at elections in the case
of both members and supporters.
The differences in demographic drivers of participation may be
pointing in the direction of party supporters being different types
of people to party members, at least in some respects. To this extent
such supporters might be a little more representative of the general
population. But the inconsistency of ﬁndings regarding de-
mographic correlates is countered by the similarity of attitudinal
drivers of campaign activism; only general subjective ideological
congruence differentiates members and supporters in this regard.
The similarities of political attitude that supporters share with
members, along with their greater numbers and aggregate
campaign impact, suggests that the former might indeed be a very
signiﬁcant pool fromwhich parties can draw. This means that non-
member supporters can potentially be mobilized on similar polit-
ical attitudinal grounds as party members. Contextual character-
istics such as constituency marginality likewise imply a similar
mobilizational potential for both groups.
In other words, although party members remain vital for party
campaigning, since they are much more readily mobilized into
high-intensity activities, our analysis conﬁrms that party sup-
porters may be a signiﬁcant organisational and human resource
when most needed by parties. Looking solely at party members
restricts us to only half of the picture and may provide an exag-
gerated impression of parties losing their grip on society. Members,
then - to borrow from Fisher and his colleagues (2014) e ‘are not
the only fruit’, but comparing members with supporters is not akin
to comparing the proverbial apples and oranges. Both groups are
important and similarly motivated resources for twenty-ﬁrst cen-
tury multi-speed membership parties. Moreover, this study seems
to conﬁrm the logic of parties opening themselves up to categories
P. Webb et al. / Electoral Studies 46 (2017) 64e74 73of supporters who are not formally deﬁned as full members, but
who could have a signiﬁcant role to play in the parties' mobi-
lizational efforts. This provides a cue both for scholars who study
the supply-side of political participation and the demand-side of
party organisational developments and strategies.Acknowledgement
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Partisan identiﬁcation by vote, 2015
Party Id. Very strong Quite strong Not very strong Number
Conservative 95.6 87.9 52.4 6446
Labour 94.6 83.7 53.4 6658
Liberal Democrat 66.7 54.4 41.9 1101
UKIP 78.4 49.6 20.8 1450
Green 72.3 54.7 17.2 587
SNP 92.3 68.6 29.2 1746
Note: Each cell reports the percentage of partisan identiﬁers voting loyally for ‘their’ party at the 2015 general election. Data source: BES panel study,
(post-election) wave 6.Table II
Voting preference by party membership and partisan identity, 2015
Con Lab LD
Members 90.5 90.7 82.7
Supporters 85.5 86.0 66.9
Note: Members ¼ percentage of party members voting loyally for ‘their’ party
very strong identiﬁers) voting loyally for ‘their’ party in 2015. Data Sources:
Table III
Number of estimated campaign activities per party
Party members
A (low) B (h
Conservative 1.3 3.3
Labour 1.2 3.3
Lib. Dem. 1.1 3.0
UKIP 1.3 3.3
Greens 1.1 3.1
SNP 1.6 4.3
Note: ‘A’ is the predicted number of campaign activities (on a scale from 1 to 5
someone we would expect to exhibit low levels of campaign activity e that
ideological incongruence with the party (10), is very authoritarian (10), mate
stituency (6). B is the predicted number of campaign activities undertaken by
that is, a woman, who has very low ideological incongruence with the party (0
EU (1), and lives in a constituency with very low majority (0). We hold demog
they have A levels qualiﬁcations, C2DE social grade and are 30 years old. In the
for somebody who was not previously a party member, whereas B is the predi
party member.UKIP Green SNP Total
88.0 79.1 91.6 87.7
85.7 66.2 97.0 81.5
in 2015; Supporters ¼ percentage of non-member party supporters (ie,
UK Party Membership Survey 2015.
Party supporters
igh) A (low) B (high)
0.8 1.0
1.4 1.7
1.1 1.4
1.3 1.5
1.8 2.2
2.4 3.0
) undertaken by an individual that has the accumulated characteristics of
is, a man (either party member or party supporter), who has very high
rialist (1), has no clear ideas on the EU (0), and lives in a very safe con-
an individual who has the characteristics of a highly active campaigner e
), is very socially liberal (0), post-materialist (3), has clear ideas about the
raphic characteristics constant for both A and B-type individuals, so that
case of party supporters, A is the predicted number of campaign activities
cted number of campaign activities of an individual who was previously a
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